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ABSTRACT

How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU mission.

European Union (EU) soldiers have deployed under the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to Macedonia, Aceh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR); EU sailors to the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean; EU police to Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Georgia; and EU border guards to Libya, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Palestinian Territories. Substantial literature addresses the various motives that impel the EU to launch these CSDP operations. Constructivist analyses point to normative rationales, social identities, and strategic cultures;¹ liberal analyses highlight the political and

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¹For example, Frédéric Mérand, "Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense," *Security Studies* 19, no. 2 (April–June 2010): 342–74; Michael Smith, "Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (February 2004): 740–58; Chris J. Bickerton, "Towards a Social Theory of EU Foreign and Security Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 171–90; Jolyon Howorth, "Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy," *West European Politics* 27, no. 2 (March 2004): 211–34; Christoph O. Meyer, "The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (September 2011): 669–90; Christoph O. Meyer and Eva Strickmann, "Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 61–81.

economic interests of individual EU member states.² Institutionalist scholars call attention to the agenda-setting power of EU officials,³ while realist scholars underline threat perceptions and alliance pressures.⁴

Thus far, however, much less attention has been paid to the actual recruitment process of EU peacekeeping forces. Once a political consensus on the launch of a specific CSDP deployment has been reached, how do CSDP missions actually become staffed? The absence of such a research topic is surprising, given that numerous studies conclude that a political consensus to launch a CSDP operation is relatively easy to achieve.⁵ The real difficulty lies in the so-called “force-generation process”: many CSDP operations have struggled with severe shortages of force contributions, impacting the effectiveness of the missions and calling the entire usefulness of the CSDP into question.⁶

In this article, I take a first stab at filling this gap. My objectives are two-fold. First, I argue the process of reaching a political consensus on the launch of a CSDP mission is, in its causal mechanisms, different from the process of recruiting force contributions for the same operation. Many EU member states are reluctant to veto a CSDP deployment.⁷ Nevertheless, committing forces to that same operation often entails an entirely different decision-making process. Second, given this important distinction, I theorize the recruitment process of EU peacekeeping forces. I argue that pivotal EU member states play a critical role in this process. These states hold, in relative terms, the strongest preference intensity regarding the CSDP

²For example, Benjamin Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations,” *European Security* 22, no. 3 (September 2013): 307–25.

³For example, Hylke Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence,” *European Security* 21, no. 3 (September 2012): 311–27; Moritz Weiss, “Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy,” *Security Studies* 21, no. 4 (October–December 2012): 654–82; Stéphanie C. Hofmann, “Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 101–20; Anand Menon, “Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalism Theory,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 83–100.

⁴For example, Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 150–51; Adrian Hyde-Price, “Neorealism: A Structural Approach to CSDP,” in *Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (New York: Palgrave, 2012); Seth Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sten Rynning, “Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 23–42.

⁵For example, Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations,” *European Security* 25, no. 4 (October 2016): 442–60; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are Transforming the European Union* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 142; Benjamin Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose and Domestic Politics* (London: Routledge, 2014), 108.

⁶For example, Mérand and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Giovanna Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives?” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 5, no. 1 (March 2011): 23–42.

⁷Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 142; Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 108; Jolyon Howorth, “Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-Governmentalism?” *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 445.

deployment.⁸ Few other EU member states share their deployment desires to the same degree. As a result, pivotal EU member states need to cajole and bargain third parties into joining the CSDP operation. To do so, these pivotal EU member states instrumentalize the dense social and institutional networks in which they are imbedded. These networks provide information and trust, and facilitate the construction of issue-linkages and side-payments. In short, Europe's deep institutional integration greatly affects the recruitment process of CSDP operations—however, in ways thus far poorly understood. EU social and institutional networks do not produce CSDP force contributions automatically: threat perceptions, strategic cultures, foreign policy interests, and ideas among EU member states do not sufficiently overlap. Nevertheless, if these networks are purposefully exploited, if they are used as a negotiation resource, they greatly facilitate the force-generation process of CSDP missions.

I use two case studies to test these claims: the EU military operation deployed to Chad and the CAR in 2008 (EUFOR Chad-CAR) and the EU police mission deployed to Afghanistan in 2007 (EUPOL Afghanistan). Both operations are the largest military and police missions the EU has conducted on its own (see Table 1).⁹ In addition, the two cases vary regarding the dependent variable of this study: EU force recruitment patterns. Both operations faced political opposition from key EU member states.¹⁰ And yet, EUFOR Chad-CAR met (after some initial difficulty) its anticipated force-requirement goals, whereas EUPOL Afghanistan struggled until the very end of its deployment to find sufficient recruits. A structured comparison of these two “most-similar” cases thus promises to shed light on the causal pathways that impact EU force generation and to assess

⁸The existence of these states has not gone unnoticed in the literature. These states orchestrate politically the launch of a specific mission; they make issues and stakes more salient, drive discussions forward, and attract states to support and serve in the planned CSDP mission. See, for example, Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 59, 91; Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 135; Alexander Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA,” (working paper, Institute for European Studies, Brussels, 2008); Catherine Gegout, “The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US *Directoire* at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 331–34; Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence;” Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building,” *International Security* 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019): 128–62.

⁹Two operations seem to outrank EUFOR Chad-CAR and EUPOL Afghanistan: the EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH) and the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH). However, both operations were deployments that the EU inherited from other organizations: EUFOR ALTHEA was the successor deployment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR). EUPM BiH started out as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The force-generation processes for both operations had been handled by NATO and the UN, respectively. On the day of the handover, most troops and police forces simply switched their badges. As a result, both operations seem inappropriate as case studies to understand EU force recruitment. Cf. Hylke Dijkstra, *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective* (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), 100, 112.

¹⁰As I explain in greater detail later, Germany and the UK viewed EUFOR Chad-CAR very skeptically, while France disliked the deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan.

Table 1. Largest CSDP operations.

Largest Military Operations by Max. Size		Largest Police Operations by Max. Size	
<i>Successor operation to NATO operation (SFOR): EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH)</i>	7,000	<i>Successor operation to UN operation (IPTF): EU Police Mission Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH)</i>	500
EU Military Mission in Chad/CAR (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	3,300	EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)	320
EU Military Force in Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)	2,259	EU Police Mission Former Republic of Yugoslavia (PROXIMA/FYROM) 1 and 2	200
EU Naval Force Somalia ATALANTA (EU-NAVFOR Somalia)	1,943	EU Police Mission Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO)	60
EU Military Mission ARTEMIS, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1,807	EU Police Mission in Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories)	58
EU Naval Operation Mediterranean SOPHIA	1,666	EU Police Mission Kinshasa, DRC (EUPOL Kinshasa)	27

critical factors that account for the experienced successes and failures of CSDP force recruitment.¹¹

The overall aim of this study is exploratory in nature. It is a pilot study attempting to build a theory that can explain EU force generation. Detailed process tracing of critical cases is particularly suited for such an endeavor. It can best grasp complex causes and render visible multifaceted causal relationships.¹² Much of the evidence presented in this study comes from over fifty semistructured elite interviews with diplomats, civil servants, and military officers from a variety of EU member states and EU institutions, which I conducted between 2010 and 2018. Because of the delicate information exchanged, many of these interviews were conducted “on background”; that is, my interview partners granted me permission to use information shared during the interview, but they asked not to be identified by name in this article. However, whenever I am authorized to indicate the name of the interviewee, I do so in the pages that follow.

The findings of this article suggest recruiting EU peacekeepers is hard political work: it involves arguing, coaxing, and often also bargaining over side-payments and issue-linkages with reluctant third parties. In the case of EUFOR Chad-CAR, France, which served as the pivotal EU member state for the operation, fully took on the latter role. It was deeply engaged in the force-generation process and distributed political side-payments and issue-

¹¹“Most-similar cases” are intended to provide quasi-experimental comparisons between a treatment case and a control case while holding background features constant. The goal is to maximize variation in Y=force recruitment. See John Gerring and Lee Cojocaru, “Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria” (working paper, Boston, MA 2015), 10; Jason Seawright, *Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 90.

¹²Seawright, *Multi-Method Social Science*, 61.

linkages to reach EU recruitment targets. In the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, however, Germany, the EU pivotal state for that mission, played a less decisive role. EU officials were largely left alone to recruit the required forces. The latter EU actors also used their social and institutional networks to cajole EU member states to provide the necessary staff input. Nevertheless, they had less success. As a result, EUPOL Afghanistan fell short of personnel goals until the operation closed in early 2016.

These findings have important theoretical as well as policy implications, especially given the flurry of EU initiatives to strengthen European security and defense cooperation since the election of Donald J. Trump as US president. Many of these initiatives have been belittled on the grounds that the EU still suffers under “persistent nationalist reflexes from member states; significant divergences in European strategic cultures; [and a] lack of consensus about the level of ambition [of EU security policy]”¹³—characteristics said to inhibit EU security cooperation for decades to come.¹⁴ This study suggests instead that EU security cooperation hinges less on common strategic interests and cultures than on highly proactive EU member states that are able to bargain fellow EU members (and sometimes non-EU members) into joining a CSDP operation. In the latter process, social and institutional networks that connect EU member states greatly matter. These ties do not lead to automatic cooperation. However, they can be instrumentalized by pivotal EU member states to organize collective EU action. As a result, the EU might have a greater capacity to advance and strengthen its security portfolio than scholars thus far expect. This would have significant consequences not only for the future of the EU but also the transatlantic relationship and US grand strategy. Moreover, the findings of this article also have important implications for security cooperation and coalition building more generally: this study illustrates that collective mobilization to confront human rights atrocities, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction does not necessarily require common preferences and preference intensities. Rather, such mobilization can be constructed; it does not have to be organic; it can be mechanical.¹⁵

¹³Jolyon Howorth, “EU–NATO Cooperation: The Key to Europe’s Security Future,” *European Security* 26, no. 3 (July 2017): 457.

¹⁴See also, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” *Daedalus* 95, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 862–915; Ulrich Krotz, “Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won’t Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 3 (June 2009): 555–78; Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” *World Politics* 63, no. 3 (July 2011): 548–79.

¹⁵For other important work on coalition building see, for example, Olivier Schmitt, *Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003); Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, *Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009); Patricia A.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. It starts by offering a brief review of the existing literature on CSDP operations. Next, it develops a “network” theory of EU force recruitment. The third section illustrates this theory by means of two case studies: EUFOR Chad-CAR and EUPOL Afghanistan. The fourth section concludes and highlights the theoretical and policy implications of this work.

What Do We Know about Cooperation in CSDP Operations?

Most research on CSDP operations takes the force-generation process as a given rather than trying to explain it.¹⁶ Often an implicit assumption exists that once a political consensus has been achieved, the force input will be generated quasi-automatically: EU member states volunteer to join CSDP operations without much political bargaining. As such, much of the literature’s focus is on how such political consensus is reached. Constructivist scholars suggest that intra-EU socialization processes are critical. Years of cooperating in common EU institutions have led to an emerging European strategic culture—that is, common values and beliefs with respect to Europe’s role in the world and the military therein.¹⁷ Common learning from the crisis that plagued the European continent in the 1990s has also contributed to a further homogenization of intra-EU security preferences.¹⁸

Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Andrew J. Pierre, *Coalitions: Building and Maintenance: Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002).

¹⁶Some exceptions do exist, notably: Katarina Engberg, *The EU and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2014) and Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*. Nevertheless, the treatment of force generation by both scholars is rather superficial. Engberg, for instance, provides detailed accounts of EU decision-making processes leading to the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad-CAR. However, for EUFOR RD Congo she simply lists the participating EU member states without explaining why those states decided to join the operation (102). For EUFOR Chad-CAR, she suggests that France, Poland, and Ireland volunteered forces (129). For Sweden, she goes into the details of the domestic decision-making process (125–26).

¹⁷For example, Antoine Rayroux, *L’Union Européenne et le maintien de la paix en Afrique* (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2017), Mérard, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense”; Smith, “Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making”; Bickerton, “Towards a Social Theory of EU Foreign and Security Policy”; Jolyon Howorth, “The Political and Security Committee: A Case Study in ‘Supranational Inter-Governmentalism’,” *Les Cahiers Européennes de Sciences Po* no. 1/2010 (March 2010): 1–24; Gilled Andréani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe’s Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), 74–76; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” *International Affairs* 77, no. 3 (July 2001): 587–603; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,” *International Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July 2005): 801–20; Bastian Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2006); Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (March 2006): 105–21; Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 523–49; Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Ana E. Juncos and Christopher Reynolds, “The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, no. 2 (January 2007): 127–47.

¹⁸Kenneth Glarbo, “Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy,” in *The Social Construction of Europe*, ed. Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener (London: Sage, 2001), 148, 55.

Realist scholars, in turn, highlight common threat perceptions and alliance pressures that compel EU member states to cooperate in CSDP missions. Barry R. Posen, for instance, suggests that “many Europeans do not like the way the United States addresses [security] problems” and thus prefer to launch CSDP missions under their own control.¹⁹ William C. Wohlforth, and Stephen G. Brooks and Wohlforth in coauthored work, argue that CSDP operations are drafting tools for a transatlantic and American-led division of labor.²⁰ Liberal scholars focus on explanations involving domestic politics. Wolfgang Wagner et al., for instance, emphasize the influence of parliaments.²¹ Benjamin Pohl, in contrast, suggests that societal interests (that is, political parties, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business lobbies, diaspora groups) inform EU member states’ preferences for CSDP missions.²² Finally, Hylke Dijkstra puts forward an institutionalist explanation. He suggests that EU officials can act as agenda setters, influencing preferences of EU member states regarding the launch of a particular CSDP mission.²³

The problem with the existing literature is that the transition from reaching a political consensus to launch a CSDP operation to the generation of actual forces for that same mission cannot be taken for granted. Several scholars have highlighted the relative ease with which EU member states, especially powerful ones, can gain such a political consensus in the EU context.²⁴ Most of these scholars concur: the real difficulty lies in staffing these operations. And yet, thus far we know very little about how the recruitment process of EU forces unfolds: who manages this process? What tools and techniques are used? And what mechanisms best explain success

¹⁹Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy,” 150–51. For a similar argument, see also Robert J. Art, “Europe Hedges Its Security Bets,” in *Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45; Felix Berenskotter and Bastian Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War,” *Security Studies* 19, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 407–52.

²⁰William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research,” *International Security* 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 93–111; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

²¹Wolfgang Wagner, et al., “Party Politics at the Water’s Edge: Contestation of Military Operations in Europe,” *European Political Science Review* 10, no. 4 (November 2018): 537–63; Wolfgang Wagner, “Is There a Parliamentary Peace? Parliamentary Veto Power and Military Interventions from Kosovo to Daesh,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 1 (February 2018): 121–34.

²²Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 144. The number of troops an EU member state deploys then depends on its “level of enthusiasm” with regard to the specific CSDP mission.

²³Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence.” See also Engberg, *The EU and Military Operations*, 99.

²⁴For example, Mérard and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Howorth, “Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy,” 445; Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 134, 142; Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 108.

or failure in reaching the desired force input? The remainder of this article aims to address these omissions in the literature.

Recruiting EU Peacekeeping Forces

In what follows, I develop a network theory of recruiting EU peacekeeping forces. The theory stipulates that some EU member states volunteer to serve in CSDP operations. Nevertheless, the number of these states is often too small to conduct an effective operation. As a result, pivotal EU member states need to step in and actively recruit additional contributors. To do so, these actors instrumentalize social and institutional networks for recruitment purposes. These ties provide information and trust. Moreover, they can be used to call in favors and construct issue-linkages and side-payments.

Agency in EU Force Generation

Some EU members care more about addressing a particular security crisis via means of a CSDP operation than others. This phenomenon has been extensively noted in the literature.²⁵ I call the EU member states that care most strongly about EU involvement in a particular conflict setting pivotal EU member states. These states put the security issue on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EU Council meetings,²⁶ as well as inquire bilaterally whether other EU member states and EU officials share their desire for external action.²⁷ At the meetings, they drive the discussion and attract and push fellow EU member states to support the CSDP proposal. As mentioned above, if the issue is not particularly controversial (that is, if it does not fundamentally contradict the security interests of another EU member state), pivotal EU member states can gain political support for their proposal relatively easily, as Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Rayroux observe: “The cost-lie-where-they-fall principle [of CSDP operations] tends to favor the permissive consensus, in the sense that it allows for a member state with a strong interest in a particular operation to go ahead.”²⁸

²⁵For example, Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 59, 91; Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 135; Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations”; Gegout, “The Quint”; Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence.”

²⁶This is the EU committee in charge of CSDP operations. Cf. Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*.

²⁷Cf. Alexander Mattelaer, *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations: Planning, Friction, Strategy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Engberg, *The EU and Military Operations*, 123.

²⁸Mérand and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations,” 449. See also Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic,” 34; Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 134.

How does an EU member state become a pivotal state? A combination of structural and domestic factors can most often explain why specific EU governments take on such a distinct leadership role: colonial legacies, threat perceptions, normative motivations, economic and geopolitical interests, and ad hoc domestic factors (for example, party ideologies and public opinion) are relevant. Some EU governments experience some or all of these stimuli at a greater intensity than others, which leads them to take a greater interest in the deployment of a CSDP operation to one place and not necessarily to another.²⁹ Why do these states then use the EU for their deployment proposal? Again, a range of factors influences this institutional choice. Often the EU is considered more legitimate and less subservient to US interests than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and more efficient than the United Nations (UN). Moreover, EU member states are also driven by ideological motivations and attachment to EU institutions.³⁰

Planning for a CSDP Operation

Once a political consensus on the launch of a CSDP operation has been reached, pivotal EU member states, in cooperation with EU officials, start to officially develop plans (concepts of operations (CONOPS)) of how the mission should look: how many troops need to be deployed, what kind of equipment is required, what kind of logistical obstacles need to be overcome, and what kind of political challenges await the operation.³¹ In the case of military operations, the EU Military Committee and its chairman take on key roles, while for civilian missions the civilian operations commander, who is also the director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), is center stage.

Once these plans have been developed, pivotal EU states and EU officials issue calls for participation, to which EU member states then react.³² Some volunteer to join the CSDP operation; either they agree with the proposal, or they see other direct benefits in participating in the CSDP project. In

²⁹I develop a theory on this topic elsewhere. See Marina E. Henke, "Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23, no. 3 (July 2017): 307–23.

³⁰For example, Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (March 2009): 45–52; Gorm R. Olsen, "The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies," *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 3 (February 2002): 87–102; Catherine Gegout, "The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2006)," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 231–44; Bruno Charbonneau, "What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 552.

³¹Tentative plans are often already developed prior to EU Council agreement.

³²To a certain degree this is a dynamic process: the development of operational plans and force generation overlap and inform each other. Mattelaer, "The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations"; Mattelaer, *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations*.

most cases, however, the number of these volunteers is too small to equip an effective operation, or the states that volunteer to join the operation are unable to provide the military capabilities considered critical to launch the operation (for example, strategic enablers such as tactical air transport, medical facilities, and other logistical support).³³ As a result, additional actions need to be undertaken: EU member states (and also often non-EU member states) need to be cajoled, compelled, and bargained into joining a specific CSDP operation. I argue that to do so most effectively, pivotal EU states exploit social and institutional networks for recruitment purposes. Why are these connections helpful?

The Role of Social and Institutional Networks in Raising an EU Peacekeeping Force

Most social and institutional networks are the result of bilateral or multilateral agreements a country has ratified.³⁴ These agreements can relate to politics, economics, security, or any other area of international cooperation. European states entertain hundreds of these connections—many of them in the context of the EU but also bilaterally or under other types of institutional umbrellas (for example, the UN or NATO). Each one of these ties connects people.³⁵ Most of these people work in official government positions: they are elected officials, bureaucrats, diplomats, or military officers. Each tie also creates practices:³⁶ because of the agreements in place these government officials are compelled to talk, exchange letters or emails with their foreign counterparts, or meet at bilateral or multilateral summits or other types of gatherings. Interdependencies and routines of interactions arise.³⁷ Not all ties have, of course, the same impact. Some may be friendly; others indifferent or downright hostile. Some may trigger repeated and intense interactions; others prompt only irregular or fleeting exchanges, thus creating strong or weak ties, respectively.³⁸ In the aggregate, however, these ties create structural opportunities. They provide pivotal EU member states with resources that can be exploited to organize collective action. What are these resources? For the purpose of this article I focus on three:

³³John Kiszely, "Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations," *Whitehall Report 1-08* (London: RUSI, 2008), 8.

³⁴At times, nongovernmental ties can, of course, also play a role. However, I leave this to future research.

³⁵Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (February 2006).

³⁶Loosely following Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, I define "practices" as patterned actions that "reproduce similar behaviors with regular meanings." See Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices: Introduction and Framework," in *International Practices*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7.

³⁷Vincent Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 29.

³⁸Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80; Anne-Marie Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 188.

First, these ties provide information on deployment preferences. “Networked” EU actors that are in semiregular contact with each other are often able to gather very detailed data on the views and constraints of their fellow countries’ political and military leadership.³⁹ Often this information gets picked up during informal, social interactions.⁴⁰ In the context of recruiting forces for a CSDP operations, such detailed information helps in assessing the available bargaining space: What capabilities can a country potentially contribute to a given CSDP operation?⁴¹ How much does a country intrinsically care to be a member of that same CSDP operation, and what external incentives might be interesting for that country to join the mission?⁴² As many bargaining studies have shown: negotiation success greatly increases depending on the information availability between two parties.⁴³

Second, social and institutional networks lower the transaction costs of such “external incentives.”⁴⁴ Dense institutional networks allow “networked” EU actors to link issues and channel side-payments via preexisting ties, thus minimizing domestic, and potentially even international, opposition to the deal.⁴⁵

³⁹Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, ed., *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 223; Iver B. Neumann, *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 19.

⁴⁰Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*, 63; David Bosco, “Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” *Global Governance* 20, no. 4 (October 2014): 551–52; Juncos and Reynolds, “Political and Security Committee,” 144.

⁴¹Military capabilities matter less if the key goal of additional force recruitment is to boost the legitimacy of the operation. Otherwise they are critical. They are a first filter. Information on intrinsic motivations and external incentives serve as a second filter.

⁴²Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 10–11.

⁴³As research on negotiations has shown, favorable distributions of interests are not sufficient for generating win-win outcomes in bargaining situations. See, for instance, Michael Tomz, *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 16; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” *World Politics* 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 336–66; Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds., *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999); David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, *Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Carsten K. W. de Dreu, Sander L. Koole, and Wolfgang Steinel, “Unfixing the Fixed Pie: A Motivated Information-Processing Approach to Integrative Negotiation,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 6 (December 2000): 975–87; Kathleen O’Connor and Peter J. Carnevale, “A Nasty but Effective Negotiation Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 23, no. 5 (May 1997): 504–15; Mara Olekalns and Philip L. Smith, “Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 85, no. 3 (March 2009): 347–48; Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!,’” 21.

⁴⁴Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” *International Organization* 15, no. 3 (Summer 1961): 366–92; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984); Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1992); Susanne Lohmann, “Linkage Politics,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 38–67. Shlomo Weber and Hans Wiesmeth, “Issue Linkage in the European Community,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 29, no. 3 (March 1991): 255–67.

⁴⁵The construction of side-payments and issue-linkages bears costs. See, for example, Bernard M. Hoekman, “Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” *International Organization* 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 697; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in*

Finally, these social and institutional networks provide for credible commitments. Cooperation in CSDP operations bears risks—especially cooperation that is not intrinsically motivated but induced by external incentives.⁴⁶ Pivotal EU member states need to worry about whether participants will fulfill their cooperation promise. Why not pocket cash or other incentives and then limit the operational commitment to the absolute minimum? Extensive institutional networks limit these risks. They increase the range of possible “retaliatory linkage” opportunities and thus maximize the costs of renegeing on an agreement by transforming single-shot games into iterated games with a longer time horizon.⁴⁷ They also create reputational concerns leading to compliance.⁴⁸

In summary, pivotal EU member states play a critical role in recruiting EU peacekeeping forces. In cooperation with EU officials, they develop operational plans and issue calls for contributions. If not enough suitable contributors volunteer to join the mission, EU pivotal states actively enlist additional forces. In this process, they instrumentalize social and institutional ties. These networks constitute a strategic asset in EU force-generation processes. The approach laid out here thus proposes a middle ground between “oversocialized” or constructivist international relations perspectives, which suggest social interactions often lead to changes in identities and preferences, and “undersocialized” or realist perspectives, which argue that institutional networks are essentially epiphenomenal.⁴⁹ The approach proposed here suggests social and institutional networks matter greatly. In the aggregate, these networks constitute a strategic reservoir: they do not necessarily modify national identities and interests, but they enable states

⁴⁵ *Transition* (Boston, MA: Little and Brown 1977), 30; Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 65; Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” *World Politics* 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 357–405.

⁴⁶ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159–60.

⁴⁷ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, *Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁴⁸ T. K. Das and Bing-Sheng Teng, “Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances,” *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 494; William D. Leach and Paul A. Sabatier, “To Trust an Adversary: Integrating Rational and Psychological Models of Collaborative Policymaking,” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): 492; Heidi Hardt, *Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 101; Brian C. Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” *International Organization* 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 243–73; Ronald S. Burt, *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 93–101; Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “Interpersonal Networks and International Security: US–Georgia Relations during the Bush Administration,” in *The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance*, ed. Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 79.

⁴⁹ For an example of what I refer to as “oversocialized” approach, see Jeffrey T. Checkel “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 801–26. For the “undersocialized” approach, see, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49.

to better understand the identities and preferences of their fellow network participants, manipulate them, and thus organize collective mobilization.

Alternative Explanations

Three alternative explanations can be advanced that provide different causal processes for producing EU force contributions.

Logic of Appropriateness

A long tradition of international relations theory emphasizes the socialization effects of international organizations, and the EU has been a key forum to test these theories.⁵⁰ Socialization is thereby mostly defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a new given community.” Socialized actors then behave “appropriately” because of conscious role-playing or norm internalization.⁵¹ In the context of a CSDP mission, a logic-of-appropriateness framework, which epitomizes the “oversocialized” approach described above, would suggest that EU member states join CSDP deployments because they perceive this action to be “the right thing to do”—given intra-EU norms and related social behavior. No bargaining for force contributions is *a priori* necessary.

The False Promise of International Institutions

Alternatively, domestic preferences and power might explain EU force generation—irrespective of existing networks. Societal interest groups such as political parties, human rights NGOs, religious organizations, diaspora groups, or even business lobbies push EU member states to contribute forces to a particular CSDP operation.⁵² If no or not enough forces are forthcoming, the most powerful EU states might use their asymmetrical power resources (economic, political, or institutional) to pressure reluctant parties into joining the CSDP operation.⁵³ Social and institutional networks are largely epiphenomenal under this framework, and power determines

⁵⁰For example, Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration,” *Comparative Political Studies* 32, no. 4 (June 1999): 435–63; Jeffrey Lewis “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36, no. 4 (December 1998): 479–504; Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx, “The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36, no. 3 (September 1998): 289–317.

⁵¹Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 810; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 25–26.

⁵²Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 144. The number of troops an EU member state deploys then depends on its “level of enthusiasm” with regard to the specific CSDP mission.

⁵³See, for instance, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining US International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton Woods* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9–10; Joseph M.

the negotiation outcomes, or, as François de Callières put it: “When a prince or state is powerful enough to dictate to his neighbors, the art of negotiation loses its value, for then there is need for nothing but a mere statement of the prince’s will.”⁵⁴

EU Officials Act as Coalition Organizers

Finally, scholars have suggested that EU officials—instead of EU pivotal states—play the most critical role in EU force-generation processes.⁵⁵ They are at the heart of the EU bureaucratic machinery, which gives them process expertise, knowledge about the state of play of policymaking, and the preferences of all actors involved.⁵⁶ To generate force contributions, EU officials can raise the topic of missing force contributions both publicly and in private meetings with EU member states. If necessary, they can thus name and shame EU member states into compliance.⁵⁷

Testable Hypotheses

What should we observe if the network theory I describe above is correct? I propose to analyze the empirical evidence in four different dimensions. These dimensions serve as “diagnostic pieces of evidence that yield insight into causal connections and mechanisms, providing leverage for adjudicating among hypotheses.”⁵⁸

Preference Structure: If the network account is correct, we should see a clear difference in preferences and preference intensities between pivotal EU states and other EU members regarding a particular CSDP deployment. Pivotal EU states stand out by being intensely interested in launching a CSDP operation. Few other EU member states share this intense deployment preference.

Agency: Given the above described preference divergence, I expect pivotal EU member states to take the lead in recruiting EU forces: they undertake bilateral diplomatic démarches, asking reluctant EU member states to

⁵⁴ Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507.

⁵⁵ As quoted in Brian C. Rathbun, *Diplomacy’s Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 13.

⁵⁶ For example, Dijkstra, *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense*, 89. At the UN similar assumptions have been made. See, for instance, Alexander J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams with Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 57.

⁵⁷ Dijkstra, *Policy-making in EU Security and Defense*, 11.

⁵⁸ For similar dynamics see, for example, Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong, “When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” *British Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 3 (July 2013): 651–72; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” *International Organization* 62, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 689–716.

⁵⁹ David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Outdated Views of Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On,” *Political Analysis* 18, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 506.

contribute troops to a specific CSDP mission. Countervailing evidence instead would show that states join CSDP operations of their own accord without any influence of these pivotal actors.

Search Process: In deciding who to approach for CSDP contributions, I expect pivotal EU member states to exploit their social and institutional networks. In concrete terms, I expect them to purposefully gather information on the deployment preferences of reluctant third parties using, for instance, their embassy staff, military officers, and other “networked” government actors to gain access to such private information.

Negotiation Process: I expect pivotal EU member states to bargain reluctant third parties into joining a CSDP mission. In this process, we should see pivotal EU member states use existing networks to construct issue-linkages and side-payments, creating a win-win outcome.

If the network theory above is incorrect, what should we notice? [Table 2](#) summarizes my expectations. Most importantly, pivotal EU member states should take on a much smaller role. These actors should not conduct an explicit and systematic search process to locate suitable force contributors. Rather, I expect EU member states to coalesce quasi-naturally based on convergent deployment preferences. Alternatively, they might be nudged by EU officials or pressured by powerful EU states to join the operation. Finally, I assume that force-generation negotiations should focus on policy coordination (for instance, to which area of the theater to deploy, what exact equipment to bring) and not on side-payments or issue-linkages.

The next section illustrates and conducts a preliminary test of the hypotheses described above using two case studies: force recruitment for EUFOR Chad-CAR and EUPOL Afghanistan.

Recruiting Forces for EUFOR Chad-CAR

EUFOR Chad-CAR deployed to Chad and the CAR in early 2008 to protect civilians who had fled the ethnic cleansing in Darfur.⁵⁹ Thousands of these refugees dwelled in camps on the Chadian and CAR sides of the Sudan-Chad/CAR border. The humanitarian and security situations in many of these camps were deplorable. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported rebel and bandit attacks on aid workers, in addition to human rights abuses targeted mainly toward women and children.⁶⁰

⁵⁹See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1778>.

⁶⁰Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP): Appeal 2007 for Chad,” <https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/consolidated-appeals-process-cap-appeal-2007-chad>.

**Table 2.** Summary of observable implications.

Dimensions	Networked Cooperation	Logic of Appropriateness	EU Officials	Domestic Preferences and Power
Preference Structure	Dissimilar intrinsic preferences/ preference intensities among EU member states	Convergent intrinsic preferences and common preference intensities among EU member states	Dissimilar intrinsic preferences/ preference intensities among EU member states	Convergent or dissimilar intrinsic preferences and preference intensities among EU member states depending on domestic pressures
	Pivotal EU states act as coalition organizers	EU member states coalesce because it is ‘the right thing to do’	EU officials act as coalition organizers	Powerful EU states act as enforcers
Agency	Pivotal EU states use social and institutional networks to locate suitable contributors	No systematic search	No systematic search	No deliberate use of networks
Search Process	Intense negotiations often involving side-payments or issue-linkages. Social and institutional networks provide for credible commitments.	Limited negotiations. EU officials try to name and shame EU members into compliance.	Negotiations focus on policy coordination, not side-payments or issue-linkages	Pivotal EU states use their asymmetrical power capabilities to pressure reluctant parties
Negotiation Process				

The French government was the most motivated to address the situation in Chad and CAR due to colonial legacies, humanitarian concerns, and geo-strategic interests.⁶¹ France thus served as the pivotal EU state for EUFOR Chad-CAR. France informed its European partners of its intention to deploy an EU mission to Chad and the CAR on 21 May 2007; all foreign offices of EU member states received word from Paris that day about a proposal “to do something in Eastern Chad.”⁶² Many EU member states were highly critical when hearing about the proposal to deploy such a CSDP mission. France was accused of neocolonialism and whitewashing French policies via the EU.⁶³ Still, given French determination to push the CSDP proposal through, EU member states granted political approval for the mission to go forward.⁶⁴ No government wanted to take it upon itself to veto the French project.⁶⁵ Once such a political consensus was achieved, the recruitment of EU forces began. Under strong influence from Paris, EU officials developed a CONOPS and a related *Statement of Requirements*, which foresaw the recruitment of ten companies (approximately 2,500 active troops) to deploy to Chad/CAR.⁶⁶ EU officials then scheduled an official “Force Generation Conference” at the EU headquarters in Brussels for November 2007. In preparation for that conference, EU member states arranged for some “dry runs,” the first of which was held in Brussels on 24 September 2007. It was chaired by the EUFOR operation commander, Irish general Pat Nash. General Nash prepared a list of specific items he considered necessary to launch the operation (for example, helicopters, jeeps, field hospital, transport equipment, and so on). He then asked all attendees, item by item, what they intended to contribute. General Nash later recalled this process as “incredibly painful.”⁶⁷ For most of the items not a single hand would go up.⁶⁸

French Instrumentalizes Its Social and Institutional Networks to Build EUFOR Chad-CAR

Given the dismal outcome of initial EUFOR force recruitment efforts, France reverted to an almost entirely different technique to build the

⁶¹Chad and the CAR are both former French colonies. Moreover, France maintains an important military base in Chad. See, for example, Guillaume Etienne, “L’opération EUFOR TCHAD/RCA: Succès et limites d’une initiative Européenne” (Paris: Terra Nova, 2009); Ronald Marchal, “Understanding French Policy toward Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task, Parts 1–3,” *African Arguments*; Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.”

⁶²Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations;” Dijkstra, *Policy-making in EU Security and Defense*, 147. France primarily picked the EU (instead of, for example, the UN) as the institutional vehicle for the operation because it thought that the EU would be quicker to organize a deployment.

⁶³Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.”

⁶⁴On the individual decisions see, for example, Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations,” 14.

⁶⁵Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 134.

⁶⁶Mattelaer, *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations*, 62.

⁶⁷Author’s interview with Pat Nash, EUFOR Commander, Cork, June 2011.

⁶⁸Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations.”

EUFOR coalition. At the Quai D'Orsay, the French Foreign Office, a cell was formed with the specific task of managing the recruitment process for EUFOR Chad-CAR. One of French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner's closest advisers, Éric Chevallier, was named special representative for EUFOR Chad-CAR and tasked to head the cell. Chevallier instructed French diplomats to purposefully collect information on the deployment preferences of EU member states (and also states outside of the EU), using all sources France had at its disposal. Chevallier's staff would then combine this information with the specific EUFOR capability needs to produce a "prospect list" of countries to be approached for detailed bilateral negotiations. Chevallier would then visit the political leadership at the highest possible level in the identified countries. The Quai d'Orsay carefully orchestrated each visit. Based on the information it had collected, it was able to provide detailed talking points to Chevallier: how the topic of Chad-CAR should be approached; which local actors might support a deployment; which actors might oppose it; what side-payments might be offered to tilt the political balance in favor of a deployment, and so forth. For example, regarding Albania's contribution to EUFOR, the French military attaché in Tirana reported that the Albanian leadership would be inclined to join the force if France subsidized the deployment; Albania wanted France to cover food rations, uniforms, vehicles, and other type of military equipment. Chevallier then used this information to pin down the exact Albanian needs.⁶⁹ In November 2007, Alexis Morel, Chevallier's collaborator, summarized the process the following way: "Obtaining commitments from EU partners [is] not automatic and [entails] some wrangling ... we are in the nuts-and-bolts phase of putting this thing together and we will push our way through."⁷⁰ In addition to the work done by Chévallier and his team, Kouchner, the French defense minister, Hervé Morin, and even French president Nicolas Sarkozy also took on important roles in building the EUFOR force. All three used bilateral or multilateral meetings they attended during fall and winter 2007 to approach potential force contributors for EUFOR Chad-CAR, often through informal conversations: "By the way, have you decided upon your contribution to EUFOR?"⁷¹ Finally, prominent EU officials, most notably the EU high representative for foreign affairs, Javier Solana, and the chairman of the EU Military Committee, Henri Bentégeat, were also involved in the EUFOR recruitment endeavor. They would provide information to France on what they knew about why states would or would not be willing to participate in

⁶⁹Nash, interview with author.

⁷⁰Cable, Embassy Paris to US secretary of state, "Chad/C.A.R.: French Views on Force Generation," 16 November 2007. Document available from author.

⁷¹Author's interview with French Official, Paris, February 2011.

EUFOR Chad-CAR. Moreover, they also tirelessly explained the benefits of the operation to potential troop-contributing nations.⁷²

The following states joined EUFOR Chad-CAR: Ireland, Poland, Austria, Sweden, Russia, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Albania, Finland, Slovenia, and Croatia (Figure 1).⁷³ Space constraints prevent me from analyzing all these cases in detail. As a result, I will focus on the recruitment process of the six largest national EUFOR contingents.

Ireland

The first task French officials hoped to accomplish in the EUFOR Chad-CAR recruitment process was to fill the position of EUFOR operation commander. In an effort to highlight that the operation was truly an EU undertaking, the French were eager to fill this position with a non-French citizen. Most often the position of operation commander is given to the country that provides the largest national contingent to the force. As a result, France's first recruitment round focused on finding a country willing to contribute a substantive number of ground troops to the EUFOR coalition and provide the operation commander. France quickly settled on Ireland as their key target for recruitment. Via its diplomatic contacts in Dublin, New York, and Brussels, the French government learned that the Irish Department of Defense was interested in joining EUFOR Chad-CAR.⁷⁴ Irish troops had just come home from a UN operation in Liberia. They judged EUFOR as an interesting next deployment option, more demanding than anything the Irish military had ever done before.⁷⁵ Moreover, and arguably more importantly, these same channels also reported that the Irish taoiseach Bertie Ahern would be particularly amenable to a personal request by Sarkozy to join EUFOR Chad-CAR. Ahern was not interested in EUFOR Chad-CAR for military, humanitarian, or other geopolitical reasons.⁷⁶ Ahern was a "local guy" who had risen through the ranks of the Fianna Fáil party because of his economic credentials.⁷⁷ Rather, Bertie Ahern wanted to win French support for his candidacy as EU president.⁷⁸ On 21 September 2007, French president Sarkozy thus invited Bertie Ahern to attend a rugby match between Ireland and France in Paris. Prior to the match, both heads of state met for a working lunch. Several of my interviewees, as well as newspaper sources, confirm

⁷²Nash, interview with author.

⁷³Additional states sent staff to the operation headquarters in Paris.

⁷⁴Author's interview with French official, Brussels, February 2011.

⁷⁵Dan Harvey, *Peace Enforcers: The EU Military Intervention in Chad* (Dublin: Book Republic, 2010), 58.

⁷⁶Author's interview with Dan Harvey, Dublin, May 2011.

⁷⁷Bertie Ahern, *Bertie Ahern: The Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 2009), 1.

⁷⁸Author's interview with French official, Paris, February 2011; Author's interview with Irish official, Newbridge, May 2011; "Bertie's High-Risk Foreign Adventure," *Phoenix*, 8 February 2008.




Figure 1. EUFOR maximum troop contributions per country.

France made a proposition to Ireland that day: if Ireland was willing to contribute troops to EUFOR Chad-CAR, France would consider backing Ahern's candidacy to become EU president. While details of the offer are not clear, Irish participation in EUFOR was most definitely decided at that particular lunch.⁷⁹ Michael Howard, the secretary-general of the Irish Department of Defense, recalls, for instance, the following:

I was in charge of telling the [Irish] treasury department how much the Chad operation would cost. We had made our calculations. Since this was probably the most challenging operation Ireland had ever participated in, we didn't want to send our boys out with bad equipment. So we came up with an estimate of €50 million—which is a lot of money. I knew that the treasury wouldn't be happy about it. So when I went to meet the secretary general of the treasury, I was kind of worried. However, when I walked into the room, the secretary general said, "Well, this has better been a f***ing nice lunch, because it will cost me €50 million." In this moment I knew that Bertie Ahern had already done all the work and the operation would go forward.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Author's interview with Irish officials, Dublin, May 2011. See also "Bertie's High-Risk Foreign Adventure"; Lara Marlowe, "A Safe Pair of Hands Take Charge of EU Force in Chad," *Irish Times*, 29 January 2008. Ahern had first made his interest in the EU presidency known in August 2007. By mid-2007, the other contenders for the position were former British prime minister Tony Blair and the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker. France had initially backed Blair as its preferred candidate for EU president. Nevertheless, Blair was a difficult candidate to back. He had little support in most other EU member states, chiefly because of his steadfast support for the US invasion in Iraq. Therefore, France was willing to reconsider its position. That being said, it would not do so without any political payoff.

⁸⁰Author's interview with Michael Howard, Newbridge, May 2011.

On 26 September, only five days after the Franco-Irish meeting in Paris, the Irish Cabinet approved the deployment of 450 Irish soldiers to Chad and the CAR.⁸¹ A week later, on 2 October 2007, the Irish government announced that General Pat Nash had been appointed operation commander of EUFOR Chad-CAR.⁸² French social and institutional networks played a critical part in making this deployment a reality. Via these ties, France learned about and was able to realize an issue-linkage: France would support Ahern's quest to become EU president and, in return, Ireland would take on a key role in EUFOR Chad-CAR.

Poland

Poland sent approximately 400 troops to Chad-CAR, the third-largest national contingent of EUFOR. Poland did not initially consider a military deployment; it had no political or economic relationships with either Chad or the CAR. Moreover, in contrast to Ireland, the Polish military was not keen on deploying to Chad. In mid-2007, approximately 5,000 Polish troops were still serving in the US-led Iraq operation or NATO's Afghanistan operation, which was quite a substantial deployment by Polish standards. Therefore, to fully understand the Polish deployment to Chad, we again need to take into account French usage of its social and institutional networks to bring Poland on board of the operation. According to my interviews, Polish participation in the EUFOR operation was decided shortly before the Lisbon Informal EU Summit on 18 October 2007.⁸³ France used the Lisbon Treaty negotiations—negotiations that would affect the future institutional makeup of the EU—to construct a side-payment that would include Polish participation in EUFOR Chad-CAR. Poland adamantly opposed the introduction of a new EU Council voting mechanism (that is, a voting mechanism that would be based on the double majority of EU citizens and EU countries). What Poland wanted in return for its support of the Lisbon Treaty (and the proposed voting mechanism) was the inclusion of the Ioannina mechanism—a mechanism that would require the EU Council to freeze decisions for two years, if (a) at least three-quarters of the population, or (b) at least three-quarters of the number of EU member states, necessary to constitute a blocking minority, indicated their opposition to the council adopting an act by qualified majority. From the Polish perspective, such a mechanism would prevent the “big” EU countries, especially Germany, from dictating EU policy.⁸⁴ The inclusion of this

⁸¹Tom Clonan, “Army’s African Mission Marks Watershed for EU,” *Irish Times*, 28 September 2007.

⁸²Adam Harvey, “Irish General to Command 3500 Troop Mission in Chad,” *Irish Times*, 3 October 2007; Philippe Bernard and Laurent Zecchini, “Paris financera l’essentiel de l’opération Tchad-CAR,” *Le Monde*, 4 October 2007.

⁸³Author’s interview with Polish diplomat, Brussels, December 2009.

⁸⁴“EU Elder Juncker Floats Compromise with Poland,” *Reuters News*, 21 June 2007.

mechanism was, however, opposed by almost all other EU members. Yet, to recruit Poland for EUFOR Chad-CAR, France declared its support for the measure (and thus the inclusion of the mechanism discussed above in the treaty) in October 2007.⁸⁵ After the Polish elections in November 2007, the new Polish defense minister Bigdan Klich confirmed Poland's promise to send soldiers to Chad.⁸⁶ However, new conditions were added to Poland's participation, such as logistical support for Polish deployment as well as military equipment. A French report estimates that France provided €2.43 million in such supplies to the Polish contingent for its military involvement in Chad-CAR overall.⁸⁷ Similar to the Irish case above, social and institutional connections, again mainly via the EU, allowed for the construction of a quid pro quo: Poland agreed to join EUFOR Chad-CAR in exchange for French support of the Ioannina mechanism (and deployment subsidies).

Austria

Austria served as the fourth-largest EUFOR troop contributor. Similar to Poland, Austria had little intrinsic interest in a deployment to Chad-CAR. The most widely read newspaper in Austria, the *Kronenzeitung*, publicly opposed any involvement in Chad-CAR, and an opinion poll published in January 2008 showed 73 percent of Austrians were against sending soldiers to Chad.⁸⁸ So, when rumors of a potential operation first appeared in Austria, the Austrian defense minister Norbert Darabos explicitly declared that Austria would not participate in EUFOR.⁸⁹ Still, in October 2007, the Austrian government changed its mind. It first announced it would send about 100 troops to Chad-CAR and then further increased this number to 240 in early November 2007.⁹⁰ What had happened? In the fall of 2007, Austria was preparing its bid for a nonpermanent UN Security Council (UNSC) seat for the period of 2009–11. Via its diplomatic networks, especially in Vienna and New York, France was fully aware of this campaign. It was also aware that Austria would have a hard time winning the elections in the UN General Assembly in fall 2008. The competition in the Western

⁸⁵Author's interview with Polish diplomat, Brussel, December 2009. The *Krakow Post* provided an almost identical explanation in their issue of 25 October 2007. Michal Wojtas, "Poland to Take Part in the EU Mission in Chad," *Krakow Post*, 25 October 2007, <http://www.krakowpost.com/article/664>.

⁸⁶"polish Defence Minister Confirms Sending Troops to Chad, Pullout from Iraq," *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 30 November 2007.

⁸⁷"French Parliament Report on the Costs of Foreign Interventions," 1 July 2009, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/11790.asp#P1848_59421.

⁸⁸"73 Prozent gegen den Tschad Einsatz," www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/73-Prozent-gegen-den-Tschad-Einsatz/227424.

⁸⁹Interview with Undersecretary Hans Winkler for the *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, 25 August 2007. The Austrian military and, in particular, its Special Forces, had an interest in the Chad operation. In their eyes, it constituted an interesting "training" opportunity in Africa, where they lacked substantial hands-on experience.

⁹⁰"Austria to Send 'up to 240' Soldiers to Chad for EU Mission," *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 7 November 2007.

European and Others Group, the UN group to which Austria belonged, was fierce. Moreover, Austria had a tainted political reputation because of extreme right-wing political figures such as Jörg Haider that were part of the Austrian governing coalition. Austria had been running an extensive campaign, using mainly its foreign aid funds, to win votes.⁹¹ Still, the tally looked bad. To remedy the situation, Austria needed the support France could potentially provide as a permanent member of the UNSC. In addition, France had dense political networks, especially in Africa, which could assist in rallying votes. Several of my interviewees suggested that Austria and, in particular, diplomats at the Austrian Foreign Office, were eager to gain what they called “positive synergies” for the Austrian bid by participating in EUFOR.⁹² A high-ranking diplomat of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the official “UN campaign manager,” for instance, admitted in our interview: “Chad helped without a doubt to win the UN Security Council elections. Nevertheless, such a reason for an Austrian military deployment would not be acceptable for the [Austrian] Parliament,” which needs to approve any Austrian foreign military deployment.⁹³ In short, to understand the Austrian deployment to Chad, France’s usage of its social and institutional networks again played a critical role. Via its diplomatic ties, France was able to learn about Austria’s key policy preferences in the fall of 2007, notably, its desire to win a nonpermanent UNSC seat. France could then use this information to construct a side-deal. Diplomatic networks thus considerably lowered the transaction costs of this recruitment effort.

Sweden

Sweden served as fifth-largest contributor to EUFOR. In contrast to the examples above, Sweden volunteered to join the mission. Sweden was interested in using the so-called Nordic EU Battle Group in Chad-CAR. Stockholm had significantly invested in this capability and now felt under pressure to demonstrate its usefulness.⁹⁴ Reportedly, even prior to the launch of EUFOR “Sweden [had] asked France whether there was a possible intervention scenario for the [Nordic] battle group as that would be important for public opinion and parliament, which had started asking questions about the costs of having the obligation to keep these units on alert. France told Sweden they had a solution, namely Chad.”⁹⁵

⁹¹Author’s interview with Austrian diplomat, Princeton, NJ, December 2009.

⁹²Author’s interview with Austrian diplomat, Vienna, July 2010.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Engberg, *The EU and Military Operations*, 125.

⁹⁵Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 149.

Russia

Russia served as sixth-largest contributor. It committed roughly 100 troops (and helicopters) to EUFOR Chad-CAR. How did this happen? Russia volunteered these forces. During a visit to Paris on 11 March 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov suggested to Kouchner that Russia join EUFOR.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Russia did not actually undertake any concrete steps to deploy to Chad until 1 September 2008. That day, EU heads of state were meeting in Brussels to discuss the deployment of an EU military observer mission to oversee the Russian withdrawal from Georgia.⁹⁷ Russian troops had invaded Georgia roughly one month earlier. While no official statement exists proving that Russia wanted to influence European or (at least) French attitudes on Russian actions in Georgia, the timing of the Russia announcement speaks volumes. It is highly likely that the Russian government wanted to gain political goodwill in Europe—and particularly with the French, who were leading the Georgian response effort. Political networks thus played less of a role in the Russian case than in the other preceding cases involving EU member states. Rather, the Russian contribution can be considered an opportunistic act: a strategic move to implicitly influence European actions.

Recruiting Forces for EUPOL Afghanistan

EUPOL Afghanistan was an EU police mission. Its deployment started in June 2007 and lasted until the end of 2016. EUPOL's mandate was to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) to fulfill its civilian policing duties and develop linkages between law enforcement and the judiciary.⁹⁸ Among all EU member states, Germany was most interested in the launch of EUPOL Afghanistan. It served as the pivotal EU member state. In 2002, Germany had agreed to serve as one of the five “lead nations” alongside Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States to rebuild Afghanistan’s security infrastructure.⁹⁹ Germany was put in charge of police reform.¹⁰⁰ By April 2002, it had launched the German Police Project Office in Afghanistan, and by 2007 it had trained about 5,000 middle- and high-ranking police officers at the police academy in Kabul. Moreover, about 14,000 Afghan police officers also participated in German-run, short-term training courses.

⁹⁶“Russie Partenariats avec l’OTAN et l’UE,” *Le Monde*, 13 March 2008.

⁹⁷Laurent Zecchini, “Moscou continue de coopérer avec l’OTAN sur l’Afghanistan et l’UE sur le Tchad,” *Le Monde*, 13 September 2008.

⁹⁸Jonna Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?” *Policy Brief* (Center for European Reform, London, 27 April 2010).

⁹⁹European Court of Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results,” (European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg, 2015), 9.

¹⁰⁰Japan settled on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, Italy on justice reform, the UK on combating drugs, and the United States on rebuilding the army.

Nevertheless, the German police reform output fell dramatically short of US expectations, which had anticipated that Germany would train at least 60,000 Afghan police by 2007.¹⁰¹ By 2006, the US government did not mince words when expressing its disillusionment with Germany. Supreme Allied Commander Europe General James Jones of NATO publicly stated that the German police reform effort had been “very disappointing.”¹⁰² In this context, Germany looked to the EU. It started lobbying the EU Council and fellow EU member states to become involved in police reform in Afghanistan as early as March 2006.¹⁰³ An EU mission allowed Germany to share the blame for its relatively limited engagement in Afghanistan,¹⁰⁴ while at the same time signal to the United States that close transatlantic relations were still of utmost importance to the German government.¹⁰⁵ Other EU members, however, only partially shared Germany’s concern. The UK was supportive of a potential CSDP operation.¹⁰⁶ The Italian government was also supportive of EUPOL. Similar to Germany, Italy had also struggled with its role as “lead nation” on justice reform in Afghanistan. EUPOL thus also promised to partially aid the Italian effort. France, however, was hesitant. Paris wanted the CSDP to focus on Europe’s periphery—especially Africa—not on Afghanistan. Moreover, it doubted that the EU could make a real difference in a context almost totally dominated by the United States.¹⁰⁷ Other EU member states also viewed the effort rather critically. Overall, EU member states’ support was not strong in the Afghan case.¹⁰⁸

Germany Pushes Forward

To make EUPOL Afghanistan a reality, Germany spared no efforts. It was supported in its endeavor by the EU Council Secretariat and, in particular, Javier Solana, who liked the idea. Solana, one of the architects of the CSDP, wanted to put the new EU instrument of “civilian crisis management operations” into practice. Moreover, the EU’s multiannual financial framework

¹⁰¹House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission” (2011), 42.

¹⁰²Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 100; Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “Striking the Right Balance: How to Rebuild the Afghan National Police,” *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 1 (March 2010): 83.

¹⁰³Steffen Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform: Managing Peacebuilding* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 162; Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 101.

¹⁰⁴Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations,” 320.

¹⁰⁵Maxime H. A. Larivé, “From Speeches to Actions: EU Involvement in the War in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission,” *European Security* 21, no. 2 (April 2012): 191.

¹⁰⁶Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 102; Eva Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution,” *Occasional Paper* 78 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2009), 28.

¹⁰⁷Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, 163; Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 105.

¹⁰⁸Thierry Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16: Mission Impossible?” *Brief Issue* 22 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, July 2017), 2; Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?,” 4; Edward Burke, “Game Over? The EU’s Legacy in Afghanistan,” (working paper, FRIDE, Madrid, 2014), 14.

for 2007–13 still provided resources for additional missions.¹⁰⁹ So why not launch EUPOL Afghanistan? In July 2006, the EU Council thus started planning an assessment mission to leave for Kabul on 10 September 2006. The mission report was discussed in the EU Council committees in October 2006. It outlined several options for a mission to work with varying intensity in the areas of justice, police, prisons, and governance on both the central and provincial levels.¹¹⁰ Between 27 November and 14 December 2006, a second fact-finding mission went to Afghanistan. The conclusions of that mission were analyzed the moment Germany took over the EU Council presidency in January 2007.¹¹¹ Based on the second mission report, German diplomats altered the shape of the mission to focus almost exclusively on police reform. A German police commissioner, Friedrich Eichele, was charged in February 2007 with drafting EUPOL's mission's mandate and CONOPS.¹¹² On 23 April the EU Council adopted the CONOPS and on 30 May officially established EUPOL Afghanistan. Germany had lobbied its fellow EU member states hard to gain a unanimous political consensus in the EU Council. When things looked a bit shaky, the German government agreed to lead the mission and provide the bulk of police officers.¹¹³ France refrained from vetoing the mission, mostly because it did not want to jeopardize its good relationship with Germany.¹¹⁴ Thus, similar to EUFOR Chad-CAR, a consensus-seeking attitude prevailed in the process to reach a political accord to launch EUPOL Afghanistan. The operation officially started on 15 June 2007.

EUPOL Afghanistan Becomes a Laughingstock

Initial plans by Francesc Vendrell, then serving as EU special representative for Afghanistan, had called for at least 2,000 EUPOL staff.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, German diplomats had dramatically scaled down the proposal. The first official EUPOL mandate foresaw 195 police and legal experts. Given the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, the mandate was revised to 400 EUPOL personnel in May 2008.¹¹⁶ However, only a fraction of this

¹⁰⁹Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, 162.

¹¹⁰European Council, "Report Following the Joint EU Assessment Mission on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan between 20–21 September 2006" (European Council, Brussels, 2006).

¹¹¹Gross, *Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan*, 28.

¹¹²Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, 163.

¹¹³Ibid. This was to be achieved primarily by reassigning those officers already working for the German police project and sending some additional ones.

¹¹⁴pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 108.

¹¹⁵House of Lords, "The EU's Afghan Police Mission," 28.

¹¹⁶European Council, "Council Conclusions on Afghanistan. 2870th External Relations Council Meeting. Brussels, 26 and 27 May 2008" (European Council, Brussels, 2008). Pohl suggests that the personnel increase was "a unilateral decision by the German foreign minister." Several EU member states and the EU Council Secretariat opposed the idea: "they warned, warned – nothing, run over [by Berlin]." See Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 112–13

number materialized over the course of 2007 and 2008. Indeed, when the mission was unveiled in June 2007, it counted only ten police officers to conduct it.¹¹⁷ It then took until the end of February 2009—almost two years later—to reach the mandated initial size of 195 EUPOL personnel.¹¹⁸ By the end of 2010, EUPOL Afghanistan had still not reached the threshold of 300 staff (see Figure 2).¹¹⁹ What was going on? Standard explanations point to the difficulty of recruiting police forces compared to military personnel.¹²⁰ Moreover, EUPOL Afghanistan competed with parallel EU operations such as EULEX Kosovo and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which were more attractive to join, especially because of the difficult security situation in Afghanistan.¹²¹ Nevertheless, an additional reason was arguably Germany's lack of involvement in the recruitment process.¹²² In stark contrast to EUFOR Chad-CAR, where France contributed much political capital to enlist EU forces, Germany was decidedly less poised to do so.¹²³ The head of EUPOL from 2008–10, Kai Vittrup, recalls in this regard: “I am quite convinced that Germany never [called] other countries directly [to contribute forces to EUPOL].”¹²⁴

EU Officials Try to Fill the Voids

With the inauguration of US president Barack Obama in January 2009 and his administration’s determination to turn the security situation in Afghanistan around, pressure mounted on the EU to fix EUPOL Afghanistan.¹²⁵ In this context, EU officials in Brussels sprang into action. According to my interviews, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, tried to use the political leverage she had as chair of EU Council meetings to name and shame EU member states to contribute forces to EUPOL. “She [was] leading the conversation,” EU Afghanistan Representative Vygaudas Usackas recalls. She “check[ed] in

¹¹⁷Burke, “Game Over?”, 13.

¹¹⁸House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 44; Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16,” 2.

¹¹⁹European Court Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan,” 16.

¹²⁰The core mission, ethos, and organizational cultures of police forces and military forces are fundamentally different. Police forces traditionally do not deploy abroad and have much less spare capacity. Moreover, specialization is often needed, and this limits applicants. Some countries also have police forces that are not nationally controlled but are under the purview of local state governments (for example, Germany).

¹²¹Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16,” 2. European Court Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan,” 17; Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, 165. Disappointed at its EU allies’ lack of vigor, Washington refused to extend the protection of the American armed forces to EUPOL staff and joined Turkey in obstructing an agreement between the EU and NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). See Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, “The Common Security and Defence Policy as an Act of American Hegemony,” *European Security* 22, no. 1 (January 2013): 67.

¹²²Strong political leadership could have arguably overcome some of the obstacles described in the previous two footnotes.

¹²³Burke, “Game Over?”, 6.

¹²⁴Author’s phone interview with Kai Vittrup, head of EUPOL, January 2018.

¹²⁵Author’s phone interview with Vygaudas Usackas, head of EU delegation in Afghanistan and EU special representative, January 2018.




Figure 2. EU POL staff evolution.

[with EU member states] every two weeks. [She met] with the foreign ministers. [She asked them:] What has been delivered and what has not? It [was] both a political and moral drive.”¹²⁶ On the ground in Afghanistan, Usackas, who also held the position of head of EU delegation, tried to pursue a similar strategy. He would hold weekly meetings at the EU embassy in Kabul with resident EU member state ambassadors, reminding them to tell their capitals to staff EU POL Afghanistan. He would also communicate this message to any visiting EU foreign ministers.¹²⁷ Kees Klompenhouwer, EU head of the civilian missions, also worked hard to recruit EU police forces.¹²⁸ To make EU POL Afghanistan more attractive than other ongoing CSDP operations (for example, the EU police mission in Kosovo), Klompenhouwer arranged to raise the allowances the EU provided to EU POL staff above the level of those in other EU missions (that is, in Kosovo and Georgia).¹²⁹ With this bonus in hand, Klompenhouwer then traveled to a number of EU member states to seek force contributions.¹³⁰

¹²⁶Usackas, interview with author.

¹²⁷ibid.

¹²⁸House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 28. The civilian operation commander, who is also the director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), exercises command and control of EU POL at a strategic level, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee. The head of mission exercises operational control over EU POL and assumes its day-to-day management.

¹²⁹Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?”

¹³⁰Vittrup, interview with author.

His stops included Germany, Italy, the UK, France, Sweden, and his country of origin: the Netherlands. Klompenhouwer recalls that his démarches in the Netherlands were no doubt the most successful. Before being appointed as EU head of civilian missions in 2008, Klompenhouwer had worked for decades for the Dutch Foreign Ministry as director for East and South-Eastern Europe, director for foreign intelligence and Dutch ambassador to Serbia—among others. As a result, he could now use his personal contacts to ask for help with EUPOL Afghanistan: “I worked the Netherlands to increase their contribution. I went to see members of parliament, members of the government and so on. I started lobbying them ... [You serve as a flagship for your country] they want you to be successful.”¹³¹ Klompenhouwer was able to persuade the Dutch government to contribute twenty-three staff to EUPOL Afghanistan—the third-largest contribution (see Figure 3). The head of EUPOL, Vittrup, tells a similar story. As a Dane himself, he was critical in securing a strong Danish EUPOL component: “I asked the [Danish] national police commissioner [and] his office [directly]. I wanted more Danes [in EUPOL]. I also spoke to the CPCC. They supported it ... and from their side put pressure I knew many of [the people] involved.”¹³² Jukka Savolainen, the Finnish head of mission who succeeded Vittrup, also played a critical role in motivating Finland to provide the largest number of EUPOL forces. Finland held the EU presidency in the second half of 2006 when the first steps toward EUPOL Afghanistan were taken.¹³³ Finland liked the idea that the EU would get involved in civilian (rather than military) missions. It thus wanted to support the initial steps of the EU in this direction.¹³⁴ Still, it was Savolainen who managed to recruit additional Finnish personnel.¹³⁵ The Swedish commitment to EUPOL Afghanistan, in turn, can best be explained by the fact that Sweden took over the EU presidency in January 2009—precisely when the United States launched its “Afghanistan surge” campaign. Sweden felt much of the US pressure, and thus one of its priorities as president of the EU Council was to arrest the EU’s diminishing political role in Afghanistan.¹³⁶ Sweden sent nineteen staff to EUPOL. Finally, the UK commitment, the sixth-largest EUPOL commitment, can best be explained by Great Britain’s heavy involvement in Afghanistan.¹³⁷ Klompenhouwer, indeed, recalls that the UK reenergized EUPOL politically in early 2010—thus picking up the slack from Germany. At a NATO

¹³¹Author phone interview with Kees Klompenhouwer, head of CPCC, January 2018.

¹³²Vittrup, interview with author.

¹³³Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, 162.

¹³⁴Pohl also suggests that Finland wanted to offset its very limited military engagement in Afghanistan with greater efforts in the civilian arena. See Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 101.

¹³⁵Usackas, interview with author.

¹³⁶Burke, “Game Over?,” 5.

¹³⁷Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 102, 105.




Figure 3. EUPOL maximum seconded staff contributions per country.

meeting in Brunssum (Netherlands), a high-ranking UK military official approached Klompenhouwer and said: “Let’s have dinner together with Lieutenant General William Caldwell [the head of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan] and let’s get deeper into this. Let’s get to know each other and reach an agreement to try to support each other’s efforts.”¹³⁸ Klompenhouwer considered this dinner a “tipping point.” Thereafter, the UK “led” EUPOL at the strategic-political level.¹³⁹ It helped with the execution of EUPOL Afghanistan, although its involvement in force recruitment remained limited. As a result, EUPOL Afghanistan never reached its mandated size. Indeed, because not enough seconded personnel were forthcoming, the EU reverted to a different technique: hiring contracted staff (see Figure 2).¹⁴⁰

Assessment of Case Studies

In this section I will weigh the evidence in favor of the network theory and its competitors using the four different dimensions developed above: preference structure, agency, search process, and negotiation process (see Table 3).

France served as the pivotal actor in the recruitment process for EUFOR Chad-CAR. It is safe to say that without French leadership, EUFOR Chad-

¹³⁸Klompenhouwer, interview with author.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Any CSDP operation is composed of seconded and contracted staff. Seconded staff come from member states. Contracted staff, predominantly in charge of administrative tasks, are directly hired by the CSDP operation (that is, the head of mission). In the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, some contracted staff (not all) were used to fulfill tasks normally fulfilled by seconded staff.

Table 3. Assessment of case evidence.

Dimensions	EUFOR Chad-CAR	EUPOL Afghanistan
Preference Structure	France served as pivotal EU state. Most EU member states did not share French deployment preferences. Sweden was an exception.	Germany served as pivotal EU state. Some EU member states shared Germany's deployment preferences (Italy, the UK) but others were indifferent or opposed to the operation.
Agency	France played a critical role as coalition organizer.	EU officials tried to recruit EU police forces to the best of their abilities.
Search Process	France systematically searched for force contributions using its social and institutional networks to extract information on deployment preferences.	EU officials relied on social networks (esp. in their country of origin) for recruitment appeals.
Negotiation Process	France exploited preexisting diplomatic ties to construct issue-linkages and side-payments. There is little to no evidence that France tried to coerce reluctant parties into compliance. Rather, the deals sought a win-win outcome.	EU officials increased EU allowances to attract CSDP contributions. They also tried to name and shame EU member states into compliance.

CAR would never have seen the light of day. Few EU member states shared the urgency of the French CSDP effort and did not volunteer to participate in the operation. Thus, with regard to the preference structure underpinning EUFOR Chad-CAR, we find little evidence for preference convergence among EU member states. Given the initial recruitment failures led by Brussels, France reverted to actively bargaining states into joining the operation. This shows that France as pivotal EU state held much of the agency in the EUFOR recruitment process. During the search process for suitable EUFOR candidates, French officials purposefully instrumentalized the social and institutional networks within which they were embedded to locate suitable EUFOR contributors. They systematically exploited the informational advantages of these networks. Regarding the negotiation process, France again used these institutional ties to construct issue-linkages and side-payments. With respect to Ireland and Poland, the issue-linkages struck concerned intra-EU affairs: it appears that France agreed to support Bertie Ahern's bid to become EU president and to back the inclusion of the Ioannina mechanism. With regard to Austria, UN ties were critical. France could leverage its status as a permanent (P5) member and offer Austria help with its bid to win a nonpermanent UNSC seat. Regarding Russia, a state that is decidedly less "networked" with France than the EU states described above, these ties were less important. Russia volunteered to join EUFOR Chad-CAR with the apparent expectation to gain French and European goodwill in the Georgia crisis. Overall, the EUFOR Chad-CAR case study thus displays many of the pathways proposed by the network

framework elaborated above. It also highlights the potency of pivotal EU member states to recruit EU forces, despite a lack of convergent EU preferences.

EUPOL Afghanistan tells a somewhat different story. Similar to EUFOR Chad-CAR, few EU states were enthusiastic about the mission. Thus, we also need to speak of a heterogeneous preference structure. Nevertheless, with regard to agency, Germany, the pivotal EU state for EUPOL Afghanistan, did not engage in the same recruitment efforts as did France for EUFOR Chad-CAR. Because of this lack of German engagement, EU officials got deeply involved in the recruitment drive, especially after the election of US president Obama and the resulting US pressure to fix the EUPOL project. To recruit EU forces, EU officials changed the EUPOL incentive structure on the ground (for example, by raising EUPOL allowances).¹⁴¹ Moreover, they used EU institutions (and their agenda-setting power and the power of the pulpit) to name and shame reluctant EU member states. Finally, they made strategic use of their social and institutional networks to call in favors and make personal appeals. This was particularly effective in their countries of origin, where they had the most extensive connections dating back decades. Overall, however, these recruitment attempts were less potent compared to what France was able to achieve for EUFOR Chad-CAR. France could offer side-payments and issue-linkages, whereas EU officials had to rely on moral and personal appeals. As a result, EUPOL Afghanistan suffered under the lack of seconded staff during the entire time of its deployment.¹⁴²

Implications

Much ink has been spilled on why CSDP operations are launched. Little to no attention has been paid to explaining how these operations become staffed. How does the EU force-recruitment process unfold? This omission motivated the present study. The article made two theoretical claims. First, pivotal EU states play a critical role in recruiting EU forces. Second, in this recruitment process, pivotal EU states instrumentalize social and institutional ties. These networks provide trust and information. They allow for the calling in of favors and facilitate the construction of issue-linkages and

¹⁴¹EU seconded civilian personnel would get €1,000 as a monthly allowance from the EU in addition to their regular national salary.

¹⁴²Were the bureaucratic recruitment differences between police and military forces insurmountable? Pohl suggests that EU governments could have overcome these obstacles “by prioritizing support for the mission within domestic bureaucracies. Their reluctance to cut corners revealed that many EU governments did not in fact attach utmost importance to this mission, despite official proclamations to the contrary.” See Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 121. I agree with this assessment. For example, EU member states could have provided extra political and financial incentives to their police forces to deploy to Afghanistan—if the political will had existed.

side-payments. The case study evidence presented here illustrates many of the posited causal interactions and pathways.

The findings of this article have important theoretical and policy implications. First, these findings contribute to our understanding of how EU security cooperation comes about. Many scholars and policy practitioners insist that European cooperation in security and defense requires convergent European threat perceptions and strategic cultures.¹⁴³ The findings of this article, however, suggest that, at least in the context of CSDP operations, such preference convergence is *not* a sine qua non. Rather, what is necessary is strong and unwavering political leadership: CSDP recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU states willing to bargain reluctant participants into joining a collective EU endeavor. If these states are absent, EU officials can pick up the slack. However, given the incapacity of these officials to distribute side-payments and issue-linkages, recruitment goals will be less likely met.

Second, these findings suggest that Europe's dense social and institutional structures are of great use in realizing these force-generation efforts. These ties constitute an invaluable resource to organize collective EU action. Nevertheless, the impact of these networks does not occur automatically, as many scholars focusing on socialization dynamics would posit. Rather, EU member states need to consciously use these institutional and social connections as an organizing tool (for instance, to collect information and construct issue-linkages and side-payments). In this sense, this study makes an important distinction between being connected and using these connections as an instrument.¹⁴⁴ The approach laid out here thus proposes a middle ground between "undersocialized" realist perspectives and "oversocialized" constructivist perspectives of international relations theory. My work suggests that social and institutional networks matter. The sometime endless bilateral and multilateral meetings, summits, champagne receptions, and courtesy calls—all these diplomatic activities contribute in their aggregate to a strategic reservoir. This reservoir enables states to better understand the identities and preferences of their fellow network participants, manipulate them, and thus organize collective EU action.

Third, from a policy perspective, the recruitment practices described in this article stipulate that any discussion on the prospect of European security cooperation—in the context of the CSDP but arguably also elsewhere—cannot only focus on the existence or absence of intra-EU preference convergence and the mechanisms that might lead to further harmonization of

¹⁴³For example, Howorth, "EU–NATO Cooperation," 457; Krotz and Maher, "International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy," 565; Krotz, "Momentum and Impediments."

¹⁴⁴This is a novel approach, at least in the international relations literature. See, for example, Seok-Woo Kwon and Paul S. Adler, "Social Capital: Maturation of a Field of Research," *Academy of Management Review* 39, no. 4 (October 2014): 412–22.

these preferences. Instead, key questions to ask are: Do pivotal EU actors exist that are willing and able to spearhead the collective mobilization effort? And are these actors capable to exploit the resources that their social and institutional networks provide, or, rather, do they shy away from taking on such a leadership role (that is, Germany in EUPOL Afghanistan)? It is these latter questions that largely determine when and how EU collective mobilization will occur. Outside of the EU context, similar conclusions prevail: collective mobilization does not necessarily require convergent preferences and actions. It can be deliberately constructed if the political will exists.

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